When a right-of-way boat changes course in such a way that a keep-clear
boat, despite having taken avoiding action promptly, cannot keep clear in a
seamanlike way, the right-ofway boat breaks rule 16.1.
Summary of the Facts
After A rounded the windward mark to starboard ahead of B and then gybed
onto starboard tack, she chose not to sail directly towards the next mark
but, for tactical reasons, to reach high above it. To do so, after gybing
she luffed sharply, at which point she was bow to bow with B, who was
on port tack beating to windward. The boats were now little more than
one length apart. B immediately bore away as hard as she could to avoid
a collision, but her action was not sufficient. However, A quickly luffed
still further and the two passed very close to each other but without
contact. The protest committee upheld A’s protest under rule 10
and B appealed, claiming that A had broken rule 16.1 by failing to give
B room to keep clear.
Decision
B’s appeal is upheld; she is reinstated and A is disqualified. Tactical
desires do not relieve a boat of her obligations under the rules. A was
free to adopt any course she chose to reach the leeward mark, but she
did not have the right to luff into the path of B so close to B that B
could not keep clear. Despite B’s bearing away as hard as possible,
a potentially serious collision would have occurred had A not taken avoiding
action by quickly luffing further. As it turned out, their combined efforts
narrowly averted such a collision, but that does not change the conclusion
that in this case when A gybed onto starboard tack, became the right-of-
way boat, and continued to alter course, she did not at any time give
B ‘the space [she needed] . . . while manoeuvring promptly in a
seamanlike way’ to enable A to ‘sail her course with no need
to take avoiding action.’ Therefore, A broke rule 16.1.
Although both boats were in the mark’s zone, rule 18 did not apply
because B was approaching the mark and A was leaving it (see rule 18.1(c)).
Therefore, A was not entitled to exoneration under rule 18.5(b) for her
breach of rule 16.1.